3/22/2023 0 Comments Last resortObviously Johnson knew of the decision before the Australian Parliament. The press trumpeted the news. He read a letter of support from President Johnson. Menzies told the parliament of the decision to deploy four months later, on Thursday 29 April 1965. McEwen agreed: “We mustn’t appear to be playing for time by asking questions.” Menzies concluded: “no more foot dragging”. Menzies did not want any “queries” directed to the USA. But, for appearances’ sake, “other countries should be in.” McEwen agreed: “Get some brown skins in if you can.” Similarly, Menzies wanted “more nations become involved … Asians better.” He remarked that “If we can provide B we have to think hard before we refuse.” Holt supported McEwen: “We don’t run away from this”. The USA must “decide whether to make Vietnam a battleground and to hell with Vietnam.” It was time to choose: “Either we go in or crawl out. I would go in, almost asking no questions”. Vietnam was strategically “the only barrier between us and China”. Country Party leader John McEwen argued that an American request for support was the “acid test” for us. The hand-written minutes (at NAA: A11099, 235) give chilling insights. How have such War Powers worked in the past, when speed and secrecy have trumped “parliamentary sovereignty”? Let us explore just one example – the deployment to Vietnam, 1964-65.Īccording to contemporary researchers, the key decision to send a battalion to Vietnam came at a meeting of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Menzies Cabinet on 17 December 1964.Ī mere handful of ministers, Prime Minister Menzies, Hasluck, Holt, Paltridge, and McEwen, took the decision. It must enjoy a “prerogative power” to choose war. They insist it would be too dangerous for the parliament to debate deployments abroad in advance. According to various defence experts and parliamentarians, to defend Australia we must have both speed and secrecy. The principle is often invoked as something almost sacred.Īnd yet, in various submissions to the current Joint Committee, and in discussions within it, when it comes to warfare “parliamentary sovereignty” is simply abandoned. ![]() Our parliamentarians repeatedly insist that they believe in “parliamentary sovereignty” to curb Executive overreach. ![]() If change, will it urge legislation requiring parliamentary approval in advance for deployments abroad? Or settle for something less? For instance, a “codification of the convention”, as in the UK, that parliament’s approval must be obtained? Or will it simply recommend that a new Joint Committee on defence, security and intelligence, with access to all the relevant intelligence, must sign off on any proposal before the Executive can deploy our forces into international conflict?īeyond that, what are the consequences of war for our politicians when they commit Australian forces to foreign conflict?Įxisting War Powers arrangements outrage the principle of “parliamentary sovereignty”. Will the committee recommend that the power to deploy our forces abroad – effectively the power to choose war – remains a power wielded exclusively by the Executive? Or will it recommend change? There have been over a hundred submissions, and one day of public hearings (on 9 December 2022). If war is the last resort, why doesn’t our governance system enforce that condition? Will our War Powers be reformed in 2023?Ī Joint Standing Committee of the parliament is currently inquiring into our “international armed conflict decision making”.
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